The ever-mounting hysteria over Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) seems to largely be coming from that large sector of Americans who work for, or in other ways feed from, Washington’s seemingly bottomless trough. As government employment and spending have cascaded in recent years, this has created not so much a ‘deep state’, as the right-wing paranoids suspect, but a huge and expanding protected class of people who are anxious to defend their livelihoods.
Most anti-DOGE jeremiads avoid questions of class or self-interest. Predictable Democratic allies, like the Atlantic, accuse Musk of presiding over a ‘reign of ineptitude’ and waging war on defenseless civil servants. Some suggest that this reflects a deep-seated desire by GOP neanderthals to remove objective ‘empiricists’ from Washington – presumably the same ‘experts’ who led the nation into mounting debt, high inflation, increasing class divisions and a chronic inability to get things built at reasonable cost.
Many have resorted to the tired, old ‘fascist’ meme. Anne Applebaum sees Musk’s disruption of the federal bureaucracy as nothing less than the arrival of authoritarian ‘regime change’. As if auditing the bureaucracy is now the first step towards totalitarianism. Even some populist conservatives have warned that the fallout from DOGE’s cuts will ultimately harm vulnerable working-class people the most.
The class dynamics at play in DOGE are not as straightforward as some would have it. It’s not simply a case of Musk, the billionaire oligarch, ruthlessly attacking the lowly administrator. The impetus for DOGE is primarily driven by a conflict within the middle class. On one side are public workers whose pay, and pensions, well exceed those in the private sector. On the other, there are millions who pay tax and feel harassed by regulations, particularly among Trump’s base of small business owners. Millions of middle- and working-class families not sucking the federal teat are falling ever behind the affluent elites, who seem to control the state whichever party is in power.
Throughout the Biden years, government employment and related sectors, notably in health services, have emerged as the only consistently growing high-wage sectors, a pattern evident both in the last month of his administration and Trump’s first. In contrast, material sectors, like manufacturing and mining, have slumped. In the first three years of Biden’s presidency, the ranks of government workers, at all levels, expanded by 1.5million. In 2024, the federal government reached its highest worker count in two decades. President Biden’s budget for 2025, signed in March last year, envisaged total spending to be more than 60 per cent higher than it was in 2019.
This public-spending surge has sparked the growth of a ‘new class’, to adapt former Yugoslav communist theoretician Milovan Djilas’s term for the elite bureaucrats of the Soviet system. Another useful analogy is the ‘clerisy’. Indeed, America’s version operates much as the pre-revolutionary French clergy did. This was a powerful and protected segment of society, but it was not monolithic. It had its bishops, but also parish priests, who often barely lived any better than their parishioners.
Read the rest of this piece at Spiked.
Joel Kotkin is the author of The Coming of Neo-Feudalism: A Warning to the Global Middle Class. He is the Roger Hobbs Presidential Fellow in Urban Futures at Chapman University and and directs the Center for Demographics and Policy there. He is Senior Research Fellow at the Civitas Institute at the University of Texas in Austin. Learn more at joelkotkin.com and follow him on Twitter @joelkotkin.
Photo: FMT under CC 4.0 License.
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